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Crisis States Programme 
 
Ethnic Conflicts and Traditional Self-governing Institutions:  
A Study of Laitumkhrah Dorbar1 
Apurba K. Baruah 
NEIDS, North-East Hill University (Shillong, India) 
 
 
Ethnic conflicts have been plaguing the North Eastern states of India. The situation is so 
serious that in April 2000, while inaugurating a seminar, the Governor of Meghalaya pointed 
out that each community of the region was involved in violent conflicts with one or more of 
the other communities. He maintained that this violence was affecting the everyday life of the 
ordinary citizens in a manner that threatened their rights as members of a democratic society.2 
What effect do these conflicts have on democratic governance? Are these conflicts related to 
the problems arising out of the introduction of modern democratic governance in traditional 
societies? How is tradition responding to modern governance? Many of the ethnic 
communities of the region are rooted in traditional tribal cultures, which some sections 
zealously guard. The most visible assertion of tradition is to be seen in the attempt to retain 
‘traditional political authorities’ in the name of protecting traditional cultures. For instance, in 
Meghalaya, the most advanced of the hill states of North East India, certain sections are 
trying to revive virtually defunct tribal chiefdoms called Syiemships and are demanding direct 
funding for those institutions from the Government of India.3 How is modern governance 
dealing with tradition? Is the interaction between modernity and tradition in the area of 
governance aggravating ethnic and communal conflicts? These are some questions that 
seemed to be relevant in contemporary North-East India. To find answers to these questions 
we decided to look at the tribal state of Meghalaya. This state has been experiencing ethnic 
violence at almost regular intervals since 1979.4 But what is more important is that in this 
state the perception of the social reality itself seems to have acquired an ethnocentric 
character. A look at the programmes of all the major political parties shows that ethnicity 
governs the politics of this state.5 Each community in Meghalaya views social reality from its 
own perspective. This becomes clear from the fact that whether it is the political parties (even 
the national parties are national only in a formal sense), underground extremist groups, 
                                                 
1 The term ‘institution’ is used in this paper to refer to both institutions as ‘rules’ and organisations, in the 
manner employed by the Khasi people themselves. This working paper presents some of the empirical findings 
on a Dorbar Shnong, one of the most controversial traditional institutions of North East India. There is clear 
evidence to show that the tradition is under pressure to accommodate constitutional norms and practices of 
Indian democracy of the modern kind reflecting a conflict over values. No theoretical interpretation is attempted 
for the time being. Four such other Dorbars are being investigated by NEIDS, as a part of NEIDS-LSE 
collaborative work under the Crisis states programme.  The empirical data for this paper was collected from 
April to June 2002 by K. Robin and Audery Laldinpuii with the help of Sita, Ribhalin, and Marconi, students of 
North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. The Author gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the 
then Chairman of Laitumkhrah Dorbar late Ramesh Kharpor.  
2 See, News Item ‘Communal conflicts brutalising educated youth, says Governor’ in The Shillong Times, 14 
April 2000. 
3 For an analysis of the political consequences of such attempts see, Apurba K. Baruah, ‘Democracy and 
Traditional Institutions: A case for Consensus’, Deccan Herald, 28 October 2002. 
4 For some information with regard to the capital city of Meghalaya, see, R. K. Purkayastha, ‘Social Instability 
in Shillong:1981-1991’, in B. Data Ray & S. K. Agnihotri (eds), Dynamics of a Tribal Society , New Delhi: 
Uppal, 1999, pp.276-284.  
5 For an analysis of some of these programmes see, Sushmita Sengupta, ‘Regionalism in Meghalaya’,  
unpublished PhD thesis, North Eastern Hill University, 1997. 
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student and youth organizations, or human rights organizations, all are organized as 
organizations of particular communities.6 In view of the above we proposed to examine the 
consequences of such perspectives at the local level of governance.  
 
At the lowest level of governance in the state of Meghalaya there exists the traditional 
Dorbar Shnong. According to the contemporary narrative of the traditional political system 
of the Khasi, it is a village level assembly of the Khasis around which the life of the 
community is organized. This narrative might have been affected by interventions of the 
British administration, the interaction of the Khasi with Christian Missionaries (who 
converted a large majority of the Khasis to Christianity), and also the reformist actions of the 
educated Khasi elite that emerged during the British period and continues to grow even now. 
Under the Constitution of India a modern democratic system of governance has been in place 
in the area for over fifty years. The protective discrimination under the sixth schedule of the 
Constitution made it possible for the traditional Khasi institutions to function as self-
governing Institutions at various levels. Of these the Dorbar Shnong, or the village level 
tribal councils, seem to be most important in the politics affecting the day to day 
administration and the lives of the common people. A perceptive British administrator once 
pointed out that the Khasi Chiefs were not territorial sovereigns but “democratic” chiefs 
whose authority was over subjects and not over land.7 As Sharma shows, the meaning of 
democracy in the official British perception of these chiefdoms is not very clear because 
some records also refer to them as oligarchies.8  It seems to be clear that these chiefs could 
assert their authority, not so much within defined territorial limits, as over their subjects. It 
was much later, in 1923, that the Khasi National Durbar, a newly formed social organization, 
sought to change the practice by insisting on allegiance to the state of residence.9 But in the 
context of emergence of cosmopolitan communities in many parts of the Khasi Hills, 
traditional authorities are losing their tribal (community-centred kinship-based) character, and 
chiefs of all ranks are now becoming territorial chiefs instead. A look at certain situations of 
conflict and some actions taken by some Dorbars shows that they govern localities that they 
claim to be their domains.  We explore two major conflict situations in Shillong, in 1979 and 
1998, to prove this. 
 
 In 1979, the city experienced a major riot over the celebrations of a Hindu religious festival, 
and as the reports in the newspapers showed, it quickly turned into a tribal/non-tribal conflict. 
According to one report, some leading non-tribal people issued a signed statement narrating 
the following developments. On 22 October at 4:15 pm when Kali idols were being lifted 
onto a truck to be carried for immersion from Ram Villa Puja Compound,10 near the 
Laitumkhrah police beat, a young man belonging to another community contemptuously 
crossed over the idol and it was broken. That led to a scuffle. Within minutes it became a 
fight between the tribals (Khasi) and non-tribals (mainly Bengali), and two more idols were 
broken. The police intervened and arrested two young Khasi men. Following the arrests there 
were protests against the police, who in their turn arrested two from the other community and 
then released everyone. The following day some local leaders called a meeting and decided to 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on ethnic mobilization of Youths in North East India see, Apurba K. Baruah, Youth and 
Students Organizations in North East India, Report of a Project sponsored by the ICSSR, NERC, Shillong 2000.  
7 Colonel Bivar , quoted in Keith Cantle, Notes on Khasi Law, Shillong, 1934, p.131. 
8 Manorama Sharma shows this in a paper presented in a project workshop organised in Shillong in 2002 as a 
part of the project carried out under the Crisis States programme by North Eastern Institute of Development 
Studies (‘Critiquing Traditions: The Case of Meghalaya’, Crisis States Programme Working Paper, London: 
Development Research Centre, LSE, forthcoming).  
9 See Cantle (1934), p.163. 
10 In many Indian languages the word Puja means worship or prayer. 
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punish the Bengali minorities of the area by closing their shops and establishments for seven 
days. They also decided to fine the two people from the minority community involved in the 
fight, Rs.5000 each. The decision to close down the minority shops was promptly enforced 
and miscreants started beating up minorities. Chaos broke out and hundreds of people visited 
the residential areas of the minorities and committed atrocities. In some areas minorities tried 
to resist but hundreds of so-called picketers started parading the streets with sticks. The 
administration seemed to take a soft position. In some localities minorities had to leave home 
in search of security. One person was killed, 121 were injured, 143 families were forcibly 
evicted, and a total of 567 persons were evacuated.11 Following deterioration of law and 
order, the administration imposed a curfew and called in the army. But despite these 
measures some non-tribals were issued eviction notices by Khasi landowners.12 By December 
8, the government had to take serious note of these notices and issued a warning to those 
responsible.13 This obviously was the perception of the non-tribals, who viewed it as an 
attempt at taking away their legitimate rights by the tribal majority of the State. 
 
The Dorbar’s perception of the reality was completely different from this. The Laitumkhrah 
Dorbar meeting on 24 October, declared the two Khasi boys, accused of damaging the idols, 
innocent and protested against their arrest. The Dorbar expressed its respect for all religious 
beliefs and condemned any attempts to infringe the religious rights of any community by 
anti-social elements. They demanded action against those responsible for the assault on the 
two “innocent Khasi young boys”. The Dorbar also demanded closure of all non-tribal shops 
in Laitumkhrah from 23 to 29 October, decided to disallow performance of Puja in any place 
other than temples, demanded compensation of Rs.5000 each for the two assaulted Khasi 
boys and withdrawal of armed police from Laitumkhrah. 14 There was no mention of the 
atrocities on the minorities. There is no doubt that kin-protection weighed heavily on the 
Dorbar. Their claim that the two Khasi youth were innocent was refuted 21 years later by a 
publication by the Dorbar itself. Kong Ibandalin Nongrum in an article clearly stated that in 
1979 residents of Shillong witnessed killings and discontentment emanating from an incident 
in Laitumkhrah where Khasi residents attacked the non-tribal residents and broke the idol of a 
goddess at Ram Villa temple situated at Nongrimbah near the Police Beat House.15 The very 
fact that the Dorbar was imposing restrictions on non-tribals showed that it was laying claim 
to authority to govern the area called Laitumkhrah. In the process it sought to challenge the 
legally constituted authorities because under normal constitutional procedures the two 
accused should have been produced in a court of law to judge their involvement in any crime. 
The Dorbar’s intervention made it impossible for the police to investigate the case and 
instead the police tried to appease the Dorbar’s outcry by making an equal number of arrests 
and then releasing all. The episode showed that the police were forced to act politically. It is 
clear that the Dorbars play an important role in bringing an ethnocentric perception to 
administration at the local level.  
 
This conclusion is confirmed by another episode involving vital issues of law and order.  In 
1998, the situation of Shillong deteriorated and the police requested the Dorbar Shnongs to 
help maintain law and order. But the help the Dorbars began to render in itself became a 
more serious problem. They organised volunteers to keep vigil at night in the respective 
                                                 
11 Reports in The Shillong Times, 3 November 1979. 
12 The Shillong Times, 17 November 1979. 
13 The Shillong Times, 8 December 1979. 
14 The Shillong Times, 3 November 1979 . 
15 Kong Ibandalin Nongrum, ‘Ka Laitumkhrah Mynnor Bad Mynta’, in Laitumkhrah 2000, Laitumukhrah 
Dorbar Shnong  Pyllum, Shillong, 2000, p.42. 
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localities. Most of the localities then experienced unprecedented atrocities committed by the 
volunteers who were mainly Khasis. The Shillong Times reported on 18 August 1998 that the 
sudden rise in the crime rates of Shillong and its suburbs had disrupted the police force. Each 
locality formed its own volunteer force for night vigil. Dorbars organized these volunteers 
and there were reports that quite a few people were lynched by these volunteers, and others 
had debilitating injuries inflicted on them for breaking the curfew imposed by the locality.16 
Another daily asked, “is Shillong nearing its doomsday?” This paper gave details of innocent 
non-Khasi people being killed by volunteers in various localities.17 The civil administration, 
instead of trying to enforce law, merely appealed to the local Dorbars to reduce the number 
of volunteers and requested them to hand over suspicious people to the police. The latter 
appear to have accepted that the Dorbars were the legitimate law-enforcing authority. There 
was no evidence of any of the volunteers, involved in lynching and beating up incidents, 
being booked. The gravity of the situation and its consequences for constitutional governance 
were such that, in an unprecedented intervention, the Shillong Bench of the Guwahati High 
Court directed the State Government to tackle immediately the deteriorating law and order 
situation. The court directed the government to protect the life and liberty of the people of the 
State, particularly in the capital city. 18  
 
Crime statistics collected from the police, however, do not show any remarkable increase in 
the number of recorded criminal acts. According to police records the grand total of the crime 
figures for 1997, the year preceding the troubles, in east Khasi Hills District, which includes 
Shillong, was 842. The figures went down to 791 in 1998. Incidences of crime in 1999 were 
recorded at 659.19 It is surprising that in a year when the police had to seek help from the 
Dorbars to contain crime, and when vigilantism by Dorbars led to the virtual breakdown of 
law and order, the recorded crime figures were lower than the previous year. Interestingly a 
note supplied by the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Special Branch (Shillong), 
to our researcher stated that there was a spurt of thefts, robberies, burglaries and dacoities,20 
and 193 such crimes were committed during the period from 1 January to 30 November 1998. 
Police described the incidents of violence committed by the Dorbar volunteers “as over-
reaction by some volunteer groups” and went on to explain that a feeling of exploitation by 
outsiders had continued to haunt the local tribals:  
They feel that the benefits of economic development of the state are all flowing 
outside, thus depriving them of their rightful share. Coupled with this is a sense of 
isolation and of alienation from mainland India.21  
The note expressed no regrets about the way in which the Dorbar volunteers took law into 
their own hands and committed heinous crimes. That they seem to have had a completely 
ethnocentric view of the criminal incidents and that they held other communities responsible 
for criminal activities without any investigations did not seem to bother the police.  
 
Dorbars have been active in deciding disputes between their own members and others, and 
there again ethnocentrism seems to colour perceptions. On 20 September 1990, the Mawprem 
Dorbar issued a notice to one R. Paul, preventing him from carrying on business in the 
                                                 
16 The Shillong Times, 18 August 1998. 
17 Meghalaya Guardian, 20 August 1998. 
18 The Shillong Times, 20 August 1998. 
19 Obtained from computerised Police Department records in the Office of the Director General of Police, 
Meghalaya.   
20 A term used by the Indian Police meaning robberies. 
21 Note supplied to Audrey Laldinpuii on 8 August 2002 by R. A. Rynjah, Senior Superintendant of Police, 
Shillong. 
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Dorbar area.22 The Shillong Times reported on 24 September 1990 that five shops belonging 
to non-tribal owners had been asked to close down. 23 The tone and tenor of the orders are 
those of legally constituted authorities: 
Whereas the Durbar Shnong Mawprem has found that shri R. Paul owner of 
Grocery cum Stationary Shop resident of Mawprem was involved in the incident 
on 29th August 1990 at Lower Mawprem, Shillong, causing hatred and communal 
disharmony among sections of the people of the locality: 
Therefore, the Durbar Shnong Mawprem, Shillong, direct and require the said 
person to cease carrying on the trade or occupation at the said place, and not 
again to carry on the same in any place within the jurisdiction of the Durbar 
Shnong and to remove the said trade from the place where it is now carried on 
with effect from 21st Sept. 1990 
Issued by the order of the Durbar Shnong Mawprem, Shillong. 
  Secretary  
Durbar Shnong Mawprem 
 
There is no doubt that the tenor of such notices served the purpose of creating the desired 
effect in the mind of the recipient. In this instance, Paul promptly appealed formally to the 
Dorbar, seeking a review of the decision. It is necessary to note that under the criminal 
procedure code that governs criminal offences in India, the Dorbar did not have any authority 
to pass such orders, but if repeated over a period of time such practices create de facto 
authority. The implications of the exercise of such power for the rule of law are all too 
evident. 
 
The formalization and the bureaucratisation of this traditional Khasi system of non-formal 
governance, claimed often to be ‘traditional’, are rather obvious. A notice circulated by Anil 
K. Toi, Secretary Umsoshun Dorbar Shnong on 9 April 1995 displays this trend very clearly. 
The notice reads: 
The office bearers of Umsoshun locality including the Rangbah Shnong 
(Headman) will make a thorough inspection to [sic] all the shops located at 
Umsoshunon Monday the 17.4.95 at 10.00 A. M. for verification before the 
issuing [sic] any N.O.C for trading license. All the proprietor of the shops should 
be in their shop at the time given above for the said purpose, failing the same the 
Dorbar will not take any responsibility in future.24  
There are innumerable instances that show that these Dorbars are now acting as an arm of the 
Government and they are becoming formalized. They are fast losing their traditional, non-
formal tribal character and are acquiring an authority of unprecedented formal nature through 
de facto jurisdiction. It is claimed that the Dorbars are traditional bodies. A close look at the 
functioning of these bodies might throw some light on how these institutions interact with the 
constitutional authorities, and show whether the values of these traditional institutions in any 
way influence the values of constitutional democracy in North East India. We are therefore 
studying two Dorbars, Laitumkhrah in an urban setting and Nonkynrih in a rural setting. This 
paper presents our findings in Laitumkhra. 
                                                 
22 Order of Dorbar Shnong Mawprem intimated vide Ref.DSM/1/90-37 dt. 20 September 1990. 
23 The Shillong Times, 24 September 1990. 
24 Notice circulated under signature of “Toi”. 
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Methodology 
To facilitate understanding of the Laitumkhrah Dorbar we decided to examine records of the 
Dorbar and relevant government departments so that we could have a fair idea of how the 
system functioned. During the course of our study we discovered that in the case of 
Laitumkhrah some records were maintained. Dorbar functionaries are generally reluctant to 
grant access to the records, but some of these became accessible to us because of the 
perseverance of our research investigators and the generous co-operation of the then 
chairman of the Dorbar. The chairman made it clear that the proceedings were not open to 
outsiders. According to him, the secretary does not allow scrutiny of official papers. The 
functionaries of the Dorbar are volunteers and work part time, and therefore they cannot be 
expected to maintain very systematic and easily accessible records. We tried to collect 
information from records from the two levels (the Shnong25 and the Dong26) at which the 
Dorbar functions.  
 
To supplement this we interviewed twenty Dorbar functionaries, including the chairman 
(who happens to be a Rangbah Shnong), the two other Rangbah Shnongs, the three 
secretaries and the fourteen Rangbah Dongs. These are the key functionaries of the Dorbar, 
and the unstructured interviews with them helped us unravel part of the nature of the 
authority and power that the Dorbar exercises. But to understand this it is necessary to assess 
the attitude of the residents of the Dorbar area. We therefore interviewed eighty people: forty 
drawn from twenty households in a locality with a mixed population; and another forty from 
another twenty households in a Khasi locality. In each household we tried to interview an 
adult male and an adult female, but the gender balance could not be maintained uniformly 
because of non-availability of respondents of a particular gender in certain households. The 
attempt was to collect information about the Dorbar’s ways of functioning in the most crucial 
aspects of social life, their implications for the values of constitutional democracy and also to 
assess the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the Dorbar. We are aware of the fact that the 
number of people interviewed was small and therefore cannot serve as a statistical sample. 
But it is large enough to cover a significant section of population, and give us some idea 
about people’s perception of the Dorbar. We therefore tabulated this data of individual 
responses and tried to examine the variation of perception.   
 
Since the Dorbar area includes a large commercial establishment 27 we also interviewed 34 
individuals (22 Shopkeepers and 12 petty vendors) involved in commercial activity. The 
attempt here was to see if the Dorbar enjoyed any legitimacy in the commercial 
establishment. We tried to understand this by discussing with them the prohibitory orders the 
Dorbar had issued from time to time. The opinions expressed by these interviewees were not 
strictly quantified but were used to understand the issues of legitimacy and allegiance. In 
view of the paucity of well-maintained records we decided to draw upon unstructured 
interviews to examine the functioning of the Dorbar. We also interviewed five prominent 
women, familiar with the Laitumkhrah Dorbar, to understand the women’s perception of the 
Dorbar. During interviews with the ordinary residents we also raised the issue of gender in 
connection with the functioning of the Dorbar.    
                                                 
25 Shnong  is a Khasi equivalent of Village 
26 Dong is a Khasi equivalent of neighbourhood locality. 
27 The Dorbar has no records of the number of shops and vendors but a quick survey in the main commercial 
area and the daily market showed that there were 232 shops and 67 vendors. 
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The Laitumkhrah Dorbar 
The problems related to governance of Laitumkhrah Dorbar area, in which a complex three 
tier political process exists, reflect serious conflicts between traditional communitarian and 
modern liberal democratic values. These conflicts cannot be understood without 
understanding the circumstances of development of the cosmopolitan city of Shillong created 
by the British administration of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Laitumkhrah is a 
densely populated urban locality of Shillong, the capital town of the Indian state of 
Meghalya, a state created out of the composite state of Assam in 1972 after a largely peaceful 
sustained agitation by the residents of the Khashi-Jaintia Hills and the Garo Hill districts of 
Assam. The composite state of Assam itself was created by the British after they took over in 
1826 the areas ruled by the Ahom kings, who ruled those areas for 600 years. It was under the 
Ahom rule that the Asomiya community (referred to often as the Assamese) developed as a 
major linguistic community of the region. The Ahom kingdom was confined basically to the 
Brahmaputra valley. When the British arrived, this kingdom was surrounded by a large 
number of tribal hill communities, which ruled themselves and most of whom remained 
outside the Aryan influence that led to the formation of the Asomiya. As a result they retained 
much of their tribal practices intact.28 The British initially did not interfere with the lives of 
these people, but for various political reasons, associated with the interest of the empire in 
India, gradually penetrated the areas occupied by them and gave shape to the composite state 
of Assam. This state embraced the erstwhile Asomiya- inhabited Ahom kingdom, and many of 
the tribal areas brought under British rule.29 The inclusion of these tribal areas in the newly  
created composite state forced people with strikingly different cultures to adjust to a new 
system of administration. This in turn released a peculiar process of ethnic mobilisation 
generating hopes of assimilation, but often resulting in fierce competition for power and 
opportunities. 
 
The Khasi-Jaintia tribal people of the area now called Meghalaya had come into close 
proximity with the British much earlier than many of the hill tribes of the region. With the 
coming of the British administration and missionaries to the area, they came under strong 
Western influence.30 While the introduction of school education by missionaries and 
conversion to Christianity influenced the society considerably, the most striking and direct 
consequences came in social and political life as a result of the introduction of a new system 
of administration. Despite the policy of minimal interference in the tribal way of life, 
reflected in the policies followed in the excluded and partially excluded areas, the 
administrative interventions by the British changed the face of the societies in the area. As a 
part of this intervention the British decided to establish a station in Shillong by persuading 
the Syiem of Mylliem to cede to the British authorities his right as ‘Rajah’ over the tableland 
of Shillong and by entering into agreement with some private owners.31 In the land thus 
acquired the administrative offices, European bungalows, and settlements of recruits to 
government services and practitioners in trade and commerce grew up. The Khasi (at least 
those sections which took advantage of the opportunities created by the British 
                                                 
28 For a discussion see, Lakshmi Devi, Ahom- Tribal Relation , Guwahati: Lawyers Book Stall, 1992, pp.1-18.  
29 See, H. K. Barpujari, The Comprehensive History of Assam, Vol.IV, Guwahati: Publication Board of Assam, 
1992, pp.77-257. 
30 Detailed accounts of the Christian Missionary activities are available in works like Hughes Morriss, The 
History of the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists’ Mission, to the End of the Year 1904, New Delhi: Indus, 1996 
[1910]. The  western influence in the early British period is discussed great details in P. N. Dutta, Impact of the 
West on Khasis and Jaintias, New Delhi: Cosmo, 1982. 
31 See Agreement with proprietors of land, 19 December, enclosed in Home Judicial Proceedings, April 1863: 
No. 10-12., National Archives of India, New Delhi. 
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administration) participated in this process. Jibon Roy, a member of the Sawian clan, was one 
of the close collaborators of the British in this effort.  
 
The population of Shillong, including the population of the Khasi villages in and around the 
new station, increased as people moved from other parts of the hills and plains as employees, 
traders and businessmen. As Nurara Hazarika shows, from British records, government 
employment was not very popular among the Khasis, and therefore Bengalis filled the 
vacancies.32   
 
The area in which the British enclave of Shillong was established, initially for a cantonment 
and a sanatorium, but later as the administrative headquarters, was largely vacant though 
interspersed with Khasi villages with small populations. In fact, the descriptions of Shillong 
in those days give the impression that with the exception of the Khasi villages, the rest of the 
station was without much habitation. 33 These villages attracted people migrating as 
government servants, traders and shopkeepers. While government servants were settled by 
the government, the traders and shopkeepers settled in land obtained from the Syiem of 
Mylliem and private owners.34 With the growth in administration, trade, business, and 
education the station expanded and new areas were included in it. Mawkhar and Laban were 
brought under Shillong in 1878. Some nearby areas of Laban and cantonment were included 
in 1887. Mawprem, Jhalupara, Bivar’s Estate and Hopkinson’s Wood were brought under it 
in 1895-98 period. By 1910, Laitumkhrah and Malki were incorporated. In the same year 
Shillong, a station since 1878,35 was converted into a municipality with ten wards: 
Laitumukhrah, European Quarters, Jail Road and Haneng, Police Bazar, Mawkhar, Jhalupara 
and Mawprem, Laban, Mission Compound and Jaiwa, Qualapatti, and Malki. Kench’s Trace 
was included in 1934. Nurara Hazarika shows that with Shillong becoming the headquarters 
of the British administration in the region, the process of urbanization accelerated, and this 
greatly affected the demographic picture of the area. She says that migration changed the 
demographic composition of the urban population, and like other big towns and cities we find 
a multi-ethnic population in Shillong. 36 It is in this multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan capital city of 
a tribal state that Laitumkhrah is situated. In this state, unlike in many other tribal areas of 
India, political power is vested firmly in tribal hands with 55 of the 60 seats in the Assembly 
reserved for the tribes, who also dominate the bureaucracy. 37  
 
The population figures of the Dorbar area are not available because the Dorbar does not keep 
such records. The Rangbah Shnong of Laitumukhrah, told us during an interview that a 
census of the Dorbar area was being taken up. In the absence of Dorbar records we looked at 
the electoral rolls to get an idea of the demographic situation. The rolls showed 9,829 Khasis 
and 8,038 non-Khasis in a total electorate of 17,867.38 These figures may not show the actual 
strength of the non-Khasi population in the Dorbar area because many non-tribal adults may 
not register as voters because of the sustained agitation carried out by some Khasi youth 
                                                 
32 Nurara Hazarika, Urbanization in Meghalaya: A Socio-Historical Study, Unpublished M.Phil. Diss., North 
Eastern Hill University, 1983, p 46. 
33 See I. Hussain, ‘Shillong British Enclave to Tribal City’, in A. C. Sinha et al. (eds), Hill Cities of Eastern 
Himalayas, New Delhi: Indus, 1993, p.80. 
34 See Hussain (1993), p. 76. 
35 See V. Venkata Rao, A Hundred Years of Local Self Government in Assam, Gauhati: Lawyers, 1967, pp.62 & 
118. 
36 Hazarika (1983), p.50. 
37 See Sengupta (1997). 
38 Meghalaya Electoral Roll, 1999, 17th Laitumukhrah Constituency, Shillong: Electoral Registration Officer, 
1999. 
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organizations against enrolling outsiders as voters.39 In any case these figures clearly show 
that the Khasi and non-Khasi populations are almost equal in strength in the Dorbar area. If 
our assumption about many non-Khasi names not appearing in the electoral rolls is valid, 
then the non-Khasi population may actually be a majority in the area.  
 
Laitumukhrah has a daily market, and most of the shop owners and vendors dealing in 
vegetables, fish, meat and fruits in the market area are Khasis. Until recently most major 
commercial establishments, such as grocers, stationers, restaurants and hardware stores, were 
owned by non-tribals. But repeated ethnic conflicts are creating a psychosis of fear, and many 
non-tribal traders and businessmen, particularly middle ranking ones, are selling off and 
leaving the city itself.40 Laitumkhrah has a large number of schools, colleges, hospitals and 
important places of worship of various communities, as well as a police beat. It is an urban 
area with all the amenities of modern life, and falls within the municipal limits of Ward 
No.11 of Shillong Municipality.  
 
The History of the Dorbar is difficult to trace. The Chairman of the Dorbar told us during an 
interview that Macdonald Kharkonger was the first Rangbah Shnong, and the Dorbar seems 
to have been organized during the First World War when it became necessary to distribute 
rations to the people and to form self-defence groups. This appears to be plausible because 
missionary accounts from the late-nineteenth century describe the present Laitumkhrah as 
“Hopkinson’s wood” a large property that was sold to a Mission by General Hopkinson for 
the sum of Rs.5000. There was no mention in these records of any Dorbars in the area. The 
Chairman could not trace the records of the first recorded meeting. 
 
 
Constitutional inroads  
The Dorbar has a constitution called “Rules and Regulation concerning the administration of 
Laitumkhrah”. It was adopted on 14 March 1990. These rules categorically mention that they 
aim at maintaining peace and harmony in the locality and are meant to bring about 
understanding and co-operation among the residents and are binding on all members of the 
locality.  
 
The emphasis laid in these rules on peace, harmony and co-operation is understandable 
because during the period 1979 to 1990 Shillong experienced a series of ethnic conflicts 
involving the Khasis and the Dakhrs or the non-Khasis.41 The riot of 1979 was discussed 
above. In 1987 a major riot took place when a Khasi Students’ Union (KSU)- led agitation 
turned communal, and what the police called “group clashes” between Nepalis and Khasis 
broke out. According to police records six people were killed and 65 injured, and property 
worth Rs.29,953,000 was destroyed. 231 cases were registered. In 1992 another KSU 
agitation turned violent, and again according to police records five people were killed and 85 
                                                 
39 One of the issues these organization raise frequently is about cut off year for the purpose of electoral rolls. For 
a discussion on the student’s movement in Khasi Hills see Pascal Malngiang, ‘Students and Youth 
Organizations in Meghalaya’, in Apurba K. Baruah (ed.), Student Power in North East India, New Delhi: 
Regency, 2002, pp.173-196.  
40 Well-known old Bengali shops like Jalpan and Geeta Stores changed hands only recently. 
41 Police records provided by the S. P. SSB. to Audrey Laldinpuii on 4 September 2002 at 3.00pm. Audery 
Laldinpuii was trying to ferret out information about riots and ethnic violence. Despite the fact that the DGP put 
in a word for her she was refused access to information on various pretexts. The most astounding pretext was 
that, the department destroys records every five years. Audrey’s experiences in various departments of 
Meghalaya government were revealing. An ethnocentric bureaucracy seems to suppress information about 
ethnic conflicts.  
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injured. In 1997 yet another agitation turned communal, and six people were killed. It is 
interesting that these records do not mention the truckloads of people being taken away and 
dumped just outside the state boundary at Khanapara, in neighbouring Assam. Even judicial 
enquiries seemed to have avoided such contentious issues.42 
 
As we saw in the 1979 episode, the Laitumkhrah Dorbar was initially governed by an 
ethnocentric attitude. But the steps the State Government had to take might have made them 
realise that pursuit of ethnic interests must be through means that would not attract the wrath 
of the State.43 In fact the history of the interaction of the Khasi Chiefdoms with the British, in 
the early days of British expansion in the area, and the response of the newly emerging 
educated Khasi leadership to the process of integration of the area with the Indian Union, 
shows that the community, at least at the leadership level, was apt to adopt conciliatory 
strategies without giving up what it conceived as the community goals. A discussion of the 
politics of the Khasi ‘States’ and forces like the Khasi National Dorbar and the process of 
emergence of hill tribal politics can show this convincingly, and therefore during the course 
of our research on Meghalaya we propose to examine the politics of the Khasi National 
Durbar. 
 
Under the rules adopted by the Dorbar, it has a pyramidal structure of administration in two 
tiers – the Shnong and the Dong. There are three Rangbah Shnongs elected by the Dorbar, of 
whom one is elected as the Chairman by the executive of the Dorbar. The main office bearers 
of the Dorbar are the Chairman, two other Rangbah Shnongs, the Secretary, Joint Secretary, 
and the Treasurer. The Dongs also have executive committees elected by their respective 
localities. According to the Constitution of the Dorbar, the term of the Dorbar is two years. 
The executive comprises all the Rangbah Dongs, referred to variously as the heads of the 
Dongs or deputy headmen, elected by their respective locality or Dong Dorbars, two 
members each from Seng Kynthei (women’s organization) and Seng Samla (youth 
organization) and the local Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) as a co-opted 
member. Though the Dorbar rules do not specify as to how the women’s and youth 
representatives are chosen, the Chairman of the Dorbar told us that the Dorbar executive 
selects them. It is important to note that these organizations despite their Khasi nomenclature 
are not strictly traditional organizations. During our interview with the Chairman of the 
Latumkhrah Dorbar we were told that most probably Seng Kynthei and Seng Longkmei are 
offshoots of Church organization of similar kind.  
 
Margaret Mawlong, a celebrated lady bureaucrat and leader of the women in the locality, 
maintains that the participation of women in church activities through the women’s 
organization of the Church might have contributed significantly to the increasing importance 
given to gender issues. There seems to be some truth in this assessment because during our 
investigations in the village Dorbar at Nongkynrih, the Rangbah Shnong and even individual 
women respondents told us that Seng Longkmei was a recent phenomenon. According to the 
traditions as reported by Khasi historians, women were kept out of Dorbars.44 In this sense, 
involvement of Seng Kynthei and Seng Longkmei in Dorbar affairs is a part of the reformist 
                                                 
42 For instance the Sarma Commission of Enquiry of the Disturbances At Shillong in 1992 refused to draw 
conclusions on most issues and merely stated what came before it as memoranda of various parties. 
43 The D. C. issued a warning to the Headmen to the effect that they will be held responsible for disturbances in 
their area. The new Dorbar leadership being government servants cannot be expected to ignore completely the 
possible consequences of breakdown of law and order. 
44 For a discussion on this and related issues see,  Soumen Sen (ed.) Women In Meghalaya , , Delhi: Daya 
Publishing House, 1992. 
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tendencies under the influence of the constitutional democratic politics. Gender has become 
an issue in Indian politics. Margaret Mawlong told us that her exposure to international 
conventions on women’s rights made her gender sensitive. But the tradition of keeping 
women out of politics weighs heavily on the Dorbar. Even Mawlong told us that she was 
asked to become the chairperson of the New Colony Dong, but after two meetings she gave 
up because she did not want to break tradition. This is revealing because it is the same person 
who led the women of Laitumkhrah in a crisis situation in 1982 in a manner that led to the 
formation of Seng Kynthei in Laitumkhrah. We have noted that this organization has two 
representatives in the Dorbar. During our study we asked the individual men and women 
interviewed by us whether women should be allowed to participate in the Dorbars. Only 
32.5% of the respondents said that women should participate in Dorbar affairs. A large 
majority (67.5%) of the respondents were unwilling to comment on this issue. None of the 
respondents said that women should not be allowed to participate. Laitumkhrah being a seat 
of education and a highly urbanized locality, with a lot of public discussions held in the youth 
centre, the most widely used public auditorium, it was expected that people would be aware 
of gender issues. But the weight of tradition is such that, ordinary people, both Khasis and 
non-Khasis, seem to be diffident about expressing their opinion on this issue. We have 
noticed that more than the tribal men it was the non-tribal men who were reluctant to 
comment on this issue. We noticed that the residents of Laitumkhrah feel obliged to conform 
to a particular perception of tradition so far as the Dorbar is concerned. The perception held 
of the Dorbar by ordinary residents, as an arm of the State, in which the bureaucracy appears 
to be ethnocentric, might have something to do with it.  
 
Inclusion of women in the Dorbar is indeed a break with the tradition but the other 
significant break with the past is the inclusion of representatives of modern organizations in 
the Dorbar. We have argued that Seng Kynthei is not a traditional Khasi organization. The 
same is the case with Seng Samla, the organization of Khasi youth. Historically we do not 
come across this institution in the traditional Khasi polity. Scrutiny of the Lumshora Seng 
Samla papers showed that it was a registered society under the no.SR/SSL-92/00 of 2000. 
The purpose of this registration seems to enable the youth to take care of some governme ntal 
schemes, particularly MLA and Member of Parliament (MP) funded Schemes. All the 
functionaries of the Dorbar told us during the interviews that they were aware of government 
schemes but never applied for these. But scrutiny of Lumshora Dong papers clearly showed 
that large funds were obtained under the MLA and MP schemes for various developmental 
works. The contracts under such schemes are distributed by the Rangbah Dong with the help 
of Seng Samla. The implication is clear. Despite the fact that Laitumkhrah has almost equal 
numbers of tribal and non-tribal population and non-Khasis put together outnumbers the 
Khasis in the area, the opportunities generated by the above mentioned schemes are 
monopolised by the Khasi young men because only Khasi young men can be members of 
Seng Samla.  
 
Powers of the Rangbah Shnong 
A look at the powers and functions of the Rangbah Shnongs shows that they combine 
executive and judicial powers. Part iv –A of the rules state that the Rangbah Shnong is 
required to obtain a Sanad (sanction) from the Syiem. He is required to look after peace and 
harmony in the locality. He is the judge in all conflicts and quarrels. He can summon any 
‘defaulters’ and punish them. He can punish all trouble-makers including mischief-mongers. 
According to the rules adopted by Laitumkhrah Dorbar the Rangbah Shnong is both the 
prosecutor and the judge so far as the disputes in the locality are concerned. It is important to 
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note that the rules require him to visit the various parts of the locality for inspection. In this 
sense he becomes an investigating officer, as well, giving him extraordinary  powers. There is 
nothing in the rules that makes him responsible to any other authority so far as his day-to-day 
functions are concerned. He seems to be able to exercise unbridled power in his domain. The 
only restriction that is imposed on his functions is about issuing of certificates to non-tribals 
for trading purposes. Requests for such certificates and recommendations are to be placed in 
the executive, which can take a decision. The intent is clear. The community that, with rare 
exceptions, did not have the resources nor much inclination for modern business, has begun 
to compete with the middle-sized and small business. The upwardly mobile new elite is 
trying to establish control over trade and business. Restricting recommendation for licenses 
for non-tribals appears to be a major area of conflict. A series of petitions have been filed by 
non-tribal traders against alleged discriminatory treatment by some Dorbars. At times non-
tribal traders are made to obtain trading licences from more than one authority for the same 
business. In 1987 the Chief Executive officer of the Shilong Municipality drew the attention 
of the special Secretary to the government of Meghalaya about the controversies surrounding 
this issue.45  The issue of trading by non-tribal traders is such an important one that the most 
important student union of Meghalaya, the Khasi Students’ Union, finds it necessary to 
intervene in the matter.46 The Rangbah Shnong has the power to fix rates for application fees. 
The Rangbah Dongs have similar powers in their respective localities, except for the fact that 
all matters relating to non-tribals have to be brought to the notice of the Rangbah Shnong. 
The additional power that the Rangbah Dong has is to allow house owners to let houses, 
other than for commercial purposes. The latter is the responsibility of the Dong executive.   
 
In our perusal of the records at the Dong level we noticed that the Rangbah Dong of 
Lumshora had accepted ‘fees’ at various rates for allowing residents to buy property and to 
forward applications for trading licenses by non-tribal traders. It is very interesting that the 
Laitumkhrah Dorbar executive had fixed the rate of donation for forwarding applications for 
trading licenses from non-tribal residents at Rs.5,000 to 15,000 depending upon the size of 
the establishment. The notice clarified that for small shops selling such items as beetle nuts, 
these rates will not be applied. Such shops should donate according to turnover. The same 
notice constituted a committee to interview the applicants.47 It is necessary to keep in mind 
that the Dorbar cannot issue trading licenses. That is the prerogative of the District Council, 
which is a constitutional body. The Dorbar merely forwards applications and charges huge 
amounts for doing so. The non-tribal shopkeepers we interviewed maintained that demanding 
such huge donations for forwarding applications for trading licenses is a new practice. One 
businessman of thirty years standing said that when he applied for a license thirty-odd years 
ago no such donation was demanded. This practice might have been introduced by the new 
Dorbar leadership. Fees can be collected by the Rangbah Dong and the Rangbah Shnongs for 
forwarding any application, ranging from character certificates to be obtained for acquiring a 
residential accommodation in another locality, to opening of bank accounts and transferring 
property. The Lumshora Rangbah Dong showed us documents to this effect. On 12 
December 1995, Rs.4,200 were received for permitting transfer of property. On 23 January 
1996, Rs.250 were received from one K. Kharpor as Bairangdong.48 Detailed records of the 
                                                 
45 See letter of the Chief executive officer, Shillong Municipality, to the Special Secretary, government of 
Meghalaya. Letter No. 6268 Dt31. 8. 87. 
46 See news item on the demand of the Khasi Students’ Union for closure of non-tribal trading establishments. 
Shillong Times, 24 April 2003. 
47 See Laitumkhrah Dorbar Notice ref. No.LDSP/B/-6/94/12 . 
48 Bairangdong in the Laitumkhra Dorbar parlance is a fee to be paid by an outsider to set up residence in a 
Dong. 
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fees thus received at the Shnong and Dong level were not maintained. According to the Rules 
adopted by the Dorbar all such collections are to be deposited with the Dorbar.49 Scrutiny of 
the Dorbar accounts for the period ending 24 December 2000, which included the accounts 
for the period 28 October 1997 to 24 December 2000 for the general fund, did not show any 
receipts for forwarding applications of any kind including trading licenses. During our 
interview the Chairman of the Dorbar said that hundreds of applications for trading licenses 
are received by the Dorbar. He quoted figures of 432 and 584 applications in the years 1995 
and 1998 and maintained that 330 and 206 applications were forwarded from among those. 
He could not provide figures for the later years. Even if we presume that the Dorbar went by 
the lowest of rates for forwarding such applications it would appear that in 1998 it earned 
Rs.1,030,000 from trading license fees alone.50 Dorbar finances are therefore far more than 
what they appear to be. But it is not merely a question of finances and accounts. The practice 
of charging fees for all kinds of applications, and also the introduction of new formalities 
such as interviewing applicants for licenses, are reflective of a new political culture at the 
Dorbar level that is far removed from the informal traditional system. The traditional 
Dorbars were said to be congregations of people of the community who carry on debates for 
as long as is necessary to arrive at a consensual decision. But now the Laitumkhrah Dorbar 
rules provide that at the Dorbar executive level in the event of a tie the Chairman has a 
casting vote. Constitutional representative democracy has definitely made inroads into the 
tradition.  
 
This new leadership, as the present chairman explained, consists of retired government 
officials. During the interview he maintained that there is a change in the profile of the 
incumbent chairpersons:  
In the past ordinary persons(even rif- rafs) became Rangbah Shnong/ Rangbah 
Dongs but in the recent years many government servants have been performing 
these functions.  
Of the 3 Raghbah Shongs of the Dorbar under study, one was a retired, and two were 
serving, government servants. In the fourteen Dongs, ten Rangbah Dongs belonged to the 
category of retired or serving government servants. In terms of education, of these seventeen 
key functionaries, thirteen were highly qualified (graduate or above). It is quite natural that 
the government servants brought the culture of Indian bureaucracy to the Dorbar too. 
 
The examination of Laitumkhrah Dorbar and scrutiny of some of its records has already 
shown that through a series of steps these key functionaries are formalising this traditional 
non-formal system of governance. Dorbars are moving away from their tradition. The wide-
ranging powers that the Rangbah Shnong of Laitumkhrah held are not in conformity with the 
traditional Khasi Dorbars because all authorities point out that the traditional Khasi chiefs 
were not supposed to exercise any significant powers without consultation with their Dorbar. 
Hamlet Bareh for instance says:  
The Syiem had limited powers….The Syiem could not legislate, impose taxes, and 
issue ordinances himself without the consent of the full state Dorbars.51  
The same appears to be true of the village Dorbars because Bareh says that the village 
Dorbar had the power to legislate and decide cases.52 But this concentration of powers in the 
                                                 
49 See rule VI of Part IV . 
50 206 x Rs.5000=Rs.1,030,000. 
51 Hamlet Bareh, ‘Ancient Khasi Polity’, in J. N. Sarkar & B. Datta Ray (ed), Social and Political Institutions of 
the Hill People of North East India , Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, 1990, p.72. 
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hands of the Rangbah Shnong need not necessarily be seen as a deliberate deviation from the 
tradition and a mere corrupt practice. It may as well be reflective of the values of the new 
bureaucratic elite. These powers sound more like that of a district magistrate than that of a 
traditional Khasi Headman. 
 
The rules clearly state that the only connection the Dorbar Shnong has with the District 
Council is in recommending applications for granting of trading licenses to non-tribal traders. 
In that sense the Dorbar Shnong is not a constitutional institution under the District Council. 
The requirement of the Sanad from the Syiem however seem to establish a connection with 
the District Council because the Syiem is appointed by the District Council under the United 
Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and 
Headmen) Act of 1959. This act, while defining the Headman says:  
Headman means a Myntri, a siem Raid, a Basan, a Lyndoh Raid,a Matabor, 
Elector, a pator, a Sangot, a Sordar Shnong, Sordar Raid and Rangbah Shnong.53  
Yet Laitumkhrah Dorbar rules categorically deny any connection with the District Council. 
This resistance to the authority of the District Council needs to be understood in the context 
of the strong resentment expressed by a section of the educated Khasis against the 
interference of the District Council in matters of the traditional system of governance. L. S 
Gassah says in a discussion on District Councils that after a close examination of the 
relationship of the District Councils and the traditional institutions it may be concluded that, 
under the new cons titutional set up, the Chiefs are pushed “behind the line of leadership. 
They are to keep themselves content with whatever powers and functions that were left to 
them by the District councils (emphasis added)”. 54  
 
Those who harp on the theme of the position of the traditional chiefs being threatened by 
constitutional authorities do not seem to ask the question whether it is advisable to keep their 
power and position intact in contemporary Khasi society, with its integration into what is 
often called, in north east India, a modern world. The coming of the British to the area in the 
nineteenth century, and the introduction of western education, Christianity, a money 
economy, market and modern administration, set the tribal societies on a course that led them 
to a stage that B. Pakem, the best known political scientist of Meghalaya, described as 
preparing to attain the status of a post industrial society. 55 It is necessary to examine what 
purpose the chief (Syiem or Rangbah Shnong) serves in a modern context. Wha t services do a 
Syiem offer to his people? It is surprising that no one in the community is trying to examine 
the issue of protecting the traditional authorities in terms of the general public interest, at 
least not publicly. As letters to the editors of local dailies and recent news reports over the 
illegal toll-gates erected by some Syiems show, there is very little that these authorities do for 
the people.56 There is no evidence to show that an overwhelming majority of the Khasis want 
traditions retained at any cost.     
 
                                                                                                                                                        
52 Bareh (1990), p.76. 
53 United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 
1959, Section 2(k). 
54 L. S. Gassah, ‘Effects of the District Councils on Traditional Institutions’, in L. S. Gassah (ed.), Autonomous 
District Council , New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1997, p. 215. 
55 See B. Pakem’s introduction to Pynsai Bor Syiemlieh, The Khasis and Their Matrilineal System, Shillong: 
published by the Author, 1994, pp.9-17. 
56 Letter to the Editor, ‘Check Gates in RiBhoi’, written by Don Narleng, Acting Syiem of Raid Marwet, The 
Shillong Times, 9 August 2002. 
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News reports in the local dailies about the recent suspension of two Syiems show that the 
Khasi community now is divided over the tussle between the traditional authorities and 
institutions and the constitutional authorities. In the case of the Syiem of Mylliem, the District 
Council suspended the Syiem and appointed an acting Syiem. But when the acting Syiem went 
to take over he was prevented by some myntries (ministers) and other supporters of the 
deposed Syiem on the ground that the Syiem must be elected by his Dorbar and therefore the 
acting Syiem appointed by the District Council had no legitimacy. 57 But a few days later he 
could take over without much resistance. The educated elite of the Khasi Hills have been 
divided over the issue of adjusting to the process of political reforms on constitutional lines.58 
But the reformists seemed to have gradually gained ground, though at times under the cloak 
of protecting tradition. Even now the process of accommodating the values of constitutional 
politics into a traditional form of governance is evident.  
 
The influence of constitutional democratic governance on tradition becomes clear from 
various interpolations of constitutional procedures in the functioning of traditional 
governance. Margaret Mawlong narrated to us the story of formalising the rules of election in 
Laitumkhrah Dorbar. She said that in 1998, when the Dorbar met to elect its functionaries, 
one member was elected to conduct the election proceedings, which were carried out by 
voice vote. Some members proposed the name of the election officer himself and the 
proposal was carried. Mrs Mawlong, with her long association with the higher bureaucracy, 
found it difficult to accept this and quoted from the rules governing elections to the State 
Assembly to prove the point that the election officer cannot be a candidate. Because the 
motion was already carried the person was allowed to accept the office but in the following 
year the election rules for the Dorbar were formalised on the lines of the state rules. The 
serving or retired government servants, leading the Dorbar, could not think of challenging 
her attempt at introducing non-traditional norms to Dorbar matters. Such attempts at 
integrating modern democratic practices to tradition are rather common. The tradition is 
undergoing far reaching changes and values enshrined in the Constitution of India are finding 
their way into traditional Dorbar Shnongs.   
 
The Dorbar rules do not specify the composition of the Dorbar Shnong. It merely states that 
all executive members will be of eighteen years or more in age. The powers and functions of 
the office bearers, and all such other provisions, are like the powers and functions of the 
office bearers of the institutions governed by the Societies’ Registration Act. The Rangbah 
Shnongs and the Rangbah Dongs told us during interviews that, though traditionally the 
Dorbar is composed of all adult Khasi males and Khasi women are not supposed to 
participate in public affairs, in Laitumkhrah some women are attending the Dorbar and some 
of them are in the executive also. During our interviews with five prominent women familiar 
with Laitumkhrah Dorbar, Margaret Mawlong narrated the story of how women came to 
participate in the Dorbar as a result of their attempt at prevailing upon the youth not to take 
the law into their own hands. 
  
The story she narrates is that of a hotel called Orion that was suspected of shady activities. 
The reputation of the hotel attracted protests from the young people of the locality and one 
day they gathered near the hotel to close it down. Mawlong claims that she and the wife of 
the then MLA, Peter Marboniang, intervened to convince the youths not to take the law into 
their own hands. Hurriedly a Dorbar was called and with the Dorbar crowd some women 
                                                 
57 ‘Supreme Court Upholds Syiem of Mylliem’s Suspension’, The Shillong Times, 11 August 2002. See also 
‘Hima Mylliem fails to take decision on Supreme Court order’, The Shillong Times, 17 August 2002.  
58 See, Shibanikinkar Chaube, Hill Politics in North-East India, New Delhi: Orient Longman,1973, pp.62-105.  
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walked to the house of the Minister of Law and with the intervention of the women the 
problem was solved. According to Mawlong, following that episode the Seng Kynthei was 
formed and it demanded representation in the Dorbar. The men recognized the organization 
and two representatives were accepted into the Dorbar. A new tradition seems to have 
started.  
 
The issue of women’s participation is not very simple. In Khasi Hills there is a lot of 
resistance to proposals for gender justice. The community has been matrilineal and matriliny, 
as we have shown elsewhere, has been giving Khasi women a better deal in the society than 
in most other communities in India 59. But from the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Christian Khasi-Jaintias began to attack the system on the grounds that it renders the men 
totally powerless. That they might have been greatly influenced by the patriarchal and 
patrilineal values of Christianity and the Church need not be far wrong. 60  Reports and 
writings published in U Lurshai in 1914-21, and quoted in the Meghalaya Land Reforms 
Commission Report, show that there was a determined effort on the part of the educated 
among the newly converted Khasi Christians to undo the perceived injustices men suffered 
under matriliny.61 But the efforts did not bear much fruit because at that time large sections of 
ordinary people were not sufficiently exposed to the patriarchal values of the new culture that 
came with the new rulers and the new men of God. This trend did not wear off. A section of 
the educated elite pursued it, leading to the formation of Ka Syngkhong Rympei Thymmai, 
which argues that matriliny was an aberration. 62 Margaret Mawlong’s reluctance to continue 
as the Chairperson of the New Colony Dong should be understood in the context of this 
resistance to women’s participation in public life.63 Laitumkhrah Dorbar remains dominated 
by men. Even the Seng Kynthei representatives to the Dorbar are not elected by the Kyntheis. 
They are selected by the male dominated Dorbar executive of which all the key functionaries 
are men.  
 
An arm of a modern state 
The present executive of the Dorbar is composed of three Rangbah Shnongs of whom one is 
the chairman, fourteen Rangbah Dongs, two representatives of the Seng Kynthei, two 
representatives of the Seng Samlah, and two representatives of the Laitumkhrah Sports Club. 
The local MLA is a co-opted member of the executive. The composition of the Dorbar 
executive provided for in the rules of the Dorbar and followed by it are more in conformity 
with modern day legally constituted socio-political organizations that accommodate the 
compulsions of popular democracy than with Khasi traditional institutions. Six executive 
members, coming from the Seng Kynthei, Seng Samla and the Sports club, could not be 
called representatives under traditional institutions. The MLA’s inclusion as a co-opted 
member is a deliberate break from tradition, an attempt to keep in close touch with the 
democratically elected state government.    
 
As we have noted, by significantly changing its composition the Dorbar has been trying to 
come closer to modern constitutional politics. Even the responsibilities it carries out are not 
                                                 
59 Apurba K. Baruah & Manorama Sharma, ‘Matriliny, Land Rights and Political Power in Khasi Society’, 
Indian Journal of Human Rights, 3:1-2 (1999), p.220. 
60 Lalrinchhani has shown how Christianity reinforced patriarchal Values in Mizo society . In matrilineal Khasi 
society Christianity might have helped at least the resistance to matriliny, See B. Lalrinchhani, Christianity and 
Women in Mizoram, unpublished MPhil Dissertation, North Eastern Hill University, 1998. 
61 See, The Report of The Land Reforms Commission For Khasi Hills, Shillong: Government Press, n.d. 
62 For a statement on the main arguments of this Organization  see Syiemlieh (1994), pp. 9-17. 
63 New colony Dong eventually split. We need to examine the circumstances that led to the split. 
  
17
of a traditional kind. In our perusal of the Lumshora papers we have noticed that the Rangbah 
Dong functions more as an unpaid government servant than as a tribal Headman. The normal 
governmental activities at local level, like allotment of public distribution outlets, assignment 
of contracts under developmental schemes, municipal duties like looking after parking rules 
in lanes and sanitation, are carried out by him. Government departments looking after such 
functions have fully paid officials for the work, but they merely pass it on to the Dong 
Headman. This raises a major issue about accountability of both the modern and the 
traditional authorities. We found a letter written by the secretary of Dong Lumshora on 19 
July 2001 to the secretary, Seng Samla Shnong Laitumkhra, stating that two schemes to repair 
road drainage and covering drains were to be implemented. The Secretary of the Dong 
informed the Secretary Seng Samla that it was decided that the work should be implemented 
by the Seng under some guidelines. We also noticed completion certificates being forwarded 
by the Dong to the Chief Executive Officer of Shillong Municipality with a request for 
making final payment.64 Such allotment of work is normally to be made by the Municipal 
Officer. Supervision and issuing completion certificates should only be done by such officers.  
 
However, in Laitumkhra these municipal functions are carried out by the Dong, which is not 
accountable to the Government that spends the money. The State and the central government 
departments are supposed to be governed by the rules and regulations provided fo r the 
Republic of India, which cannot discriminate between citizens on the basis of caste, creed or 
religion. By passing on their responsibilities to Dorbars, the ethnocentricity of the tradition is 
also being introduced into the functioning of the constitutional authorities. As we have 
pointed out, the Dorbar rules do not specify its composition, but our discussions with the 
Chairman, Margaret Mawlong, and the ordinary citizens confirmed that non-Khasis are not 
allowed to participate in the Dorbar proceedings. They are not even allowed to witness these. 
There seems to be a minor exception in Lumshora where non-Khasis can attend the Dorbar 
of the Dong but cannot speak. But all Dorbar decisions are binding on them. This is a clear 
case of rule without consent. That raises serious questions of exclusivist tendencies and 
ethnocentric politics that characterise ‘traditional’ institutions spilling over into constitutional 
politics. The question is not merely theoretical because by allowing an organization like the 
Seng Samla, which bars all non-Khasis from becoming members, to monopolise government 
contracts under the MLA and MP schemes, the benefits of these schemes are being restricted 
to the unemployed young men of the Khasi community in a locality where Khasi and non-
Khasi population are almost equal. Such responsibilities carried out by the Dorbar have no 
legal basis.  
 
What is more, the unauthorised transfer of responsibilities of the state to the Dorbar is also a 
source of patronage. Opportunities of patronage are making the Dorbar positions rather 
attractive and that should make us wonder whether competitive politics are making an entry 
into the traditional institution, often claimed to be based on consensual democracy. The 
episode of the election officer being nominated and elected, narrated by Margaret Mawlong, 
therefore need not be viewed only as an instance of unfamiliarity with norms or inability to 
appreciate a sense of propriety.   
 
If the Laitumkhrah Dorbar is not following the traditional norms then two questions 
regarding legitimacy need to be raised. First, do the tribal people owe their voluntary 
allegiance to the Dorbar? The answer to this question became clear when we interviewed the 
tribal and non-tribal vendors and shopkeepers about their compliance with prohibitory orders 
                                                 
64 Letters Dt.19.7.01 and 11.5.01 
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issued by the Dorbar. Out of these 34 respondents, 22 were tribal men and women and all of 
them violated the Dorbar decisions and pretended that they were unaware of these. It is 
interesting to note that all the 12 non-tribal respondents in this category showed a deference 
to the Dorbar and maintained that they always obeyed the Dorbar orders. Another non-tribal 
businessman could not be interviewed because he folded his hands and requested us to leave 
him out of these controversies. It was obvious that the non-tribal shopkeepers and 
businessmen held the Dorbar in awe. In contrast, the Khasi vendors were quite candid. They 
maintained that some the orders of the Dorbar were such that compliance would adversely 
affect their business and therefore they ignored them. They also maintained that the Dorbar 
did not try to implement its decisions, at least not the ones that affected them. A Khasi fish 
vendor vehemently criticized the Dorbar and told us that the Dorbar sends volunteers mainly 
to collect donations, “you know from whom?” she said. The implication was clear that it is 
the non-tribal shopkeepers on whom the Dorbars writ ran. The Khasi shopkeepers and 
vendors knew that except when the community in general gets mobilized and uses the Dorbar 
as a vehicle to pursue its interests, it could not enforce its decisions on them. But once 
communal frenzy has begun the Dorbar becomes a potent weapon, particularly against non-
Khasis.  
 
For the ordinary Khasis in the Laitumkhrah, the Dorbar is considered with some deference 
because the contemporary narrative of tradition glorifies it, so inducing a public 
demonstration of respect, and also because it is run by government servants. In India’s North 
East the babus (bureaucrats) exercise hegemony. The fact that all government privileges and 
facilities are channelled through the Dorbar prompts some allegiance. In the communally 
divided setting of Laitumkhrah, in the fierce competition for government patronage and share 
in the market, the Dorbar’s presence gives an edge to the Khasi middle class. That should be 
reason enough for this class to hold it in high esteem, at least in public. But it is the fear of 
the bureaucratic leadership that seems to force the ordinary citizen, particularly the educated 
middle class, to pay obeisance to it. An episode involving a fairly well placed educated Khasi 
lady and the fish vendor we referred to above led us to this conclusion. The day we 
interviewed the vendor she was very frank and told us in the market in the presence of other 
Khasi fish vendors that we could quote her and she wanted the Dorbar leadership to know 
her views. The next day we went to interview a highly educated professional and during our  
visit, sitting in front of her computer, she narrated her bitter experiences with her Dong 
leadership. She quoted a case in which residents had to go to court because the Dorbar was 
cutting off the water supply to a particular locality. She urged us to look for the records of the 
case to see for ourselves how atrocious the Dong leadership was. However, she kept 
reminding us that we should not mention her name because if the leadership came to know 
about her views she and her family would be in trouble. We eventually found the case, 
despite the vague references offered by her, and found that it had been filed against the 
government and not the Dong. It is, of course, possible that the government agencies function 
under the Dong’s guidance. We told her about the vendor and mentioned that she wanted to 
be quoted. She said that the vendor was being unwise. The same evening we received a phone 
call from the lady informing us that the vendor now wishes to remain anonymous. The well-
meaning lady professional might have made the lowly vendor wiser.  
 
The information we collected of some other Dorbars confirmed that the professional had 
good reason to be careful. The leadership at times becomes ominous. It is this fear that must 
have forced almost all our middle class informants, both Khasi and non-Khasi, to hand out a 
standard narrative about the authority of the Dorbars. The responses of almost all residents 
interviewed sounded almost tutored. For instance, in whatever form we asked the respondents 
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as to whether they could differ with the Dorbar, all except the lone brave fish vendor told us 
that it was unthinkable to differ with the Dorbar because tradition does not permit that. We 
have seen that the Dorbar is no longer functioning under traditional institutions. In that sense, 
it is not tradition that is commanding respect in Laitumkhrah. It is the power derived partly 
from the ethnically mobilized community and partly from acting as an arm of the state with 
its apparatuses of coercion and patronage that results in the de facto legitimacy that it enjoys. 
As an arm of the state the Dorbar does not only distribute patronage; it uses the coercive 
machinery of the state effectively. Our scrutiny of the general diary of the Laitumkhrah 
police station showed that the police station takes prompt action on any request from the 
Rangbah Shnong.65 The Indian police are known for their lack of respect towards ordinary 
citizens. Their prompt response to Dorbar requests shows that it represents very powerful 
political forces associated with the constitutional authorities or real politics. 
 
      
 
                                                 
65 Our luck in scrutinizing ran out soon because the Officer-in-Charge refused our researcher access to these 
dairies on the pretext that her presence created problems for the staff. 
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